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INTRODUCTION

Reportedly an old Chinese curse says, "May you live in interesting
times." If true, we are certainly accursed. A quick inventory of some of
the worldwide events of the last three years will remind us of the extraordinary circumstances in which we now live:
* The map of Eastern Europe is remade as the Warsaw Pact collapses, and east or central European countries abandon socialism as an
economic system, embracing market economics and privatization; other
countries of the world do likewise. Socialism appears bankrupt and
dead, and the Soviet Union falls apart in living color on the TV in our
living rooms.
• A petty but powerful dictator in the middle-east oil region attempts a walk-in invasion and is faced by the first post-World War II
cooperation of the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the United Nations, which
achieves a startling high-tech 100 hour ground war success, escaping a
major oil disruption but followed by many political difficulties. The
world then discovers what a close call it has had with the danger of
misused nuclear power, purchased by incredible oil profits.
* Germany is reunited, and learns the economic cost of forty-five
years of socialist statism and its rapacious elites: official actions harming the environment, raised risks of nuclear accidents, deteriorated infrastructure, numbed human spirit creating calls for "freiheit,"
freedom!
- These listed events lead many to the conclusion that the cold war
is over and the West has won. They also suggest a potential for a huge
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"peace dividend," for resources to address human and economic
problems which sorely need attention. However, they starkly pose a dilemma to the United States-will it be the world's sole superpower, in
a hegemonic or policeman's role, or will it revert to an inward looking
isolationism? If the U.S. won't stomach a major world role, will that
now leave a power vacuum with all its dangers?
Many other events and trends can also be mentioned:
- In the mid-East, opponents are talking about peace in a way
never before experienced.
- The European Economic Community rushes towards its 1992
goal of a truly unified market, but is suddenly confronted by the costs
and opportunities of the cold war collapse and the restructuring of effective borders.
" The phenomenal rise of Japanese economic strength has frightened many on this and the European continent.
* Mainland China also began a program of economic restructuring
employing market oriented principles, but its leaders became frightened
when societal forces began acting beyond the government's control.
- Latin America, and to some extent Africa, have been swept with
democratic movements installing democratic governments on a wider
scale than ever before experienced, changing economic structures.
* The U.S. and Canada have established a treaty-based Free Trade
Area after a century of unsuccessful attempts, and this is now beginning to operate in novel ways on the legal system of the parties.
* Mexico has decided not only to join the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but to seek a stronger treaty relation with
the U.S., and this has led to the U.S.-Canada-Mexico talks now rushing towards a North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Watching
carefully from the sidelines are most of the other countries in this
hemisphere, suggesting the possibility (perhaps after some time) of a
broader hemisphere wide free trade area.
On the whole, this is an optimistic picture-perhaps more optimistic than anytime since the immediate post-World War II years which
saw a remarkable flowering of new international institutions and innovative ideas for preserving the peace and raising world welfare. However, one must remember the curse. There are clouds overhead, and
problems and dilemmas to solve, some of which include:
* Who controls the nuclear weapons in the republics of the Soviet
Union?
- Will the European Community (EC) become a "fortress Europe"
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and turn inward?
- Will religious fanatics, particularly in the volatile middle-East,
prevent new efforts for peace?
* Can the disparities in living standards and culture between Mexico and the U.S. be bridged?
In my talk with you this evening, I will focus on one segment of
these broader circumstances, namely the problem of international economic relations. However, this segment is very important indeed. It has
a vital impact on all of us, our standard of living, our style of life, and
these aspects of our children's future lives-possibly even the stability
of relative peace and the durability of our democratic institutions. The
reason I opened this talk with the tour of the broader horizon, however,
is to emphasize how much our economic relations "segment" is related
to many broader questions.
We could have decades of extremely successful economic and market oriented activity which may vastly raise our standard of living, only
to see it disappear in months or even days if certain types of war occurred-even wars that somehow refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. Civil war and disarray in developing countries in Africa or Latin
America have tragically undermined any opportunity for satisfactory
lives for millions of people.
Loss of freedoms, possibly influenced by international institutions
which were designed with good intentions to address the problems of
galloping world economic interdependence, could undermine a quality
of life with which we have become complacently satisfied.
I want to approach my topic this evening, however, as a law professional, and not an economist or politician or even a philosopher. I
wish to discuss with you a number of what I call "constitutional issues," but I am not referring to the constitution of any one nation, but
rather I am referring to what I have called in some of my books' and
writings the "World Trade System," or more broadly, the international
institutional structure of world economic relations.
This structure has certain parts of its foundation in international
law and organizations, but other important parts of that foundation are
1.

JOHN

H.

JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF

GATT (1969);

JOHN

H.

JACKSON

(2d ed.
1986); John H. Jackson, International Competition in Services: A Constitutional Framework,
AND WILLIAM

DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

RELATIONS,

1988, THE AM. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES.: JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System, 1990, THE ROYAL INST. FOR INT'L AFFAIRS.
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in national legal and constitutional systems. The interplay of these two
parts of the foundation, such as we find in the legal connections of the
GATT to the U.S. constitutional structure of separation of powers, is
vitally important. It is not well understood even by knowledgeable government officials. It is, I feel strongly, an important subject for law
professionals and law schools to understand and to help the public to
understand, because it requires extensive use of the expertise of law
professionals, whether such individuals be lawyers, government officials,
professors, or law students.
I intend to discuss this subject, albeit briefly, under three topics as
follows:
* The Problem
* Coping Mechanisms and Their Problems
* Institutional Aspects and Reforms: The Lawyer's Problems
Finally, I will state some conclusions. But don't hold your breath
for any broad sweeping recommendations or claims that all matters
will be solved by some simple mechanism or reform. That approach is
not normally congenial to my style of scholarship or policy reflections,
partly because I tend to feel that it is important to be extremely empirical, to build propositions on actual facts of the real world which I have
personally observed in my various government, practitioner, or scholarship roles, or on observations which others similarly inclined have generously shared with me either privately or by publication or public
speeches.

II.

THE PROBLEM

In good law school style, I will start by stating the case, or rather,
by stating several cases which I have chosen to illustrate some
problems. In particular I will describe two prominent cases of international economic relations conflict, which may be known to you, namely:
- The tuna-dolphin case, recently resulting in a GATT panel report
that finds a U.S. import ban on tuna from Mexico to be inconsistent
with U.S. obligations under GATT.
* The EC-U.S. hormones dispute, involving an EC ban on imports
from the U.S. of beef which has been raised with the assistance of artificial hormones.
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Two Cases (Dolphins and Hormones)

First, let us examine the tuna-dolphin case between Mexico and
the U.S.2 This case, which involves ocean fishing practices, poignantly
illustrates the coming problems of reconciling GATT rules with environmental policies. The use of so-called "purse seine nets" in fishing for
tuna in the eastern Pacific territories has caused considerable loss of
dolphin life, for the odd reason that dolphins tend to swim over tuna
schools in that area. When fishing boats use the huge nets to enclose
the school which has been spotted because of the dolphins swimming on
the surface, the dolphins are captured and drowned in the harvest
process.
U.S. environmental groups have pursued this issue under the 1972
U.S. statute (amended in 1988) called the Marine Mammal Protection
Act, and have instigated law suits which required the U.S. government
to carry out the mandates of this statute. One such mandate requires
the U.S. to prohibit or embargo the importation of tuna (canned or
otherwise) from any country which does not require its fishing fleet to
conform to a series of statutorily required fishing practice standards
designed to minimize the killing of dolphins. These requirements are
imposed on U.S. fishermen, so the Congress understandably wanted to
impose equal standards on the producers exporting on the U.S.
Although Mexico argues that it has taken dolphin protection actions and conforms to multilateral international standards, it did not
meet the unilaterally imposed U.S. standards, so in March 1991, the
U.S. imposed the embargo on imports of tuna from Mexico. Mexico
then brought a complaint under the GATT, arguing a violation of
GATT rules, particularly Article XI which bans the use of quotas or
embargoes on products from other GATT parties.
The U.S. argued first that its embargo merely imposed a standard
on Mexican products equal to that imposed domestically; and also argued that exceptions clauses in Article XX of GATT permitted the
U.S. action. Without getting into the rather intricate details of this
case, we can note that the GATT panel ruled that the U.S. action was
inconsistent with the GATT. A major problem with the U.S. argument
is that the U.S. rule focused on the process of production, rather than
the characteristics of the product If the tuna imports themselves were
polluted, or were unsafe, or harmed humans or animals, there is little
2.

GATT, Restrictions on Imports of Tuna from Mexico, GATT Doc., Sept. 3, 1991, at
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question that the U.S. could impose a regulation (even prohibiting sale
or import) equal to that imposed on U.S. produced goods. But when
the focus is on processes occurring totally outside the U.S., then the
panel worried that the precedent could be used by many countries to
excuse import restrictions on account of unilateral parochial or cultural
views about production. These might include religious discriminations,
laws regarding employment of women, rigid "safety" standards or minimum wage and vacation rules, etc. Likewise the panel felt that exceptions in GATT Article XX should not apply for protection of health of
animals outside the territory of the country trying to impose import
restrictions.
Thus the panel concluded that although it recognized that some
exception to GATT rules was needed for various environmental policies, this should not be accomplished by a forced "interpretation" of
the GATT by a panel. Rather, the GATT contracting parties needed to
negotiate some changes in the GATT, such as new treaty measures or a
waiver.
Another interesting case, which also illustrates some of the hard
conceptual policy issues facing the world trading system, involves an
EC regulation imposed in 1985 which prohibited the sale or importation of beef raised with assistance of artificial hormones, whether that
beef was produced domestically within the EC or in another country
for export to the EC. The regulation resulted partly from strong European consumer pressure caused by dismay at a case in Italy where infants who had ingested some baby food beef products developed opposite sex characteristics because of hormone contamination of the food.
In the U.S. many beef farmers use hormones to assist beef raising,
and argue that they do so with complete safety. The scientific issues are
complex, but roughly it appears that in the Italian case, beef had been
injected and portions of the beef injected had found its way into the
food. In the U.S. it is claimed that a "hormone patch" is put behind
the ear of the cow, and this slowly bleeds the hormone into the cow
(which then eats and grows more efficiently, saving production costs).
Since the ear is not then put into food, and since the process introduces
the hormone gradually, the U.S. claims that scientifically there was no
justification for the ban on beef produced by this method.
The EC, however, refused to listen to this scientific reason. Indeed
both the U.S. and the EC wanted to start a GATT dispute procedure,
but each wanted a different forum: The U.S. desired a process in the
"Standards Code" of the GATT, where scientific information could be
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better utilized. The EC insisted that the procedure must be that of the
GATT itself, where the EC would maintain that GATT's Article III
"national treatment" (equal treatment for imports compared to domestic products) was the test. This argument allows each sovereign nation
to choose its product regulations for itself, even if they are foolish, as
long as it treats domestic products and imported products the same.
There is considerable justification for this view, and it demonstrates
another defect in the current GATT rules.
The U.S. proceeded unilaterally in this case also, imposing certain
restrictions on imports from the EC as "sanctions," without a GATT or
GATT code procedure. The EC protested, and the parties have negotiated for temporary settlements and expect or hope to have a settlement,
probably in the context of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations
(where one issue discussed is that of so-called "phytosanitary rules"
regarding agricultural products).'
B.

Other Situations Briefly Described

There are many other cases or situations which I could relate also.
Indeed under the GATT dispute settlement procedures alone, there
have been over 250 cases.4 There are many thousands of other situations which illustrate similar problems. Let me simply outline several of
these: 5
3. Hormone Residues in Animal Products Safe, InternationalCommittee on Food Safety
Says, INT'L TRADE REP., Nov. 9, 1988, Vol. 5, at 1484; EC Offers Plan Aimed at Diffusing
Bilateral Dispute Over Hormone Ban, De Clercq Says, INT'L TRADE REP., Nov. 23, 1988, Vol. 5,
at 1522; The EC Ban on Hormones in Meat Will Stay, INT'L TRADE REP., May 16, 1990, Vol. 7,
at 703.
4. JOHN H. JACKSON. THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM. LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMic RELATIONS (1989).

5. Regarding the agricultural problem, see David Gardner, Brussels Strives to Keep Farm
Reform Plans on Track, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1991, at 27; U.S., EC Seen Reaching Broad Agreement on GATT Farm Trade by End of Next Week, INT'L TRADE REP., Dec. 11, 1991, Vol. 8, at
1789; DALE E. HATHAWAY. NATIONAL PLAN. ASS'N, AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
GATT. LOOKING AHEAD, 13, at 9-12; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH. GIST: AGRICULTURE IN
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, (1991).
With respect to the position of the Cairns Group regarding subsidies in agriculture, see, e.g.,
General Developments: GA TT. Cairns Group Says It Will Not Accept a "Cosmetic" Agricultural
Agreement, INT'L TRADE REP., Dec. 11, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1807; Export Policy: Agriculture. Cairns
Group Must Be Working Together to Fight Subsidies, Australian Minister Says. INT'L TRADE
REP., Aug. 10, 1988, Vol. 5, at 1124.
Regarding the Airbus case, see, e.g., General Developments: Trade Policy. Deadlines Approach for Two GATT Airbus Complaints, Boeing Official Tells ABA, INT'L TRADE REP., Nov.
6, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1628; General Developments: GATT. Panel Completes Review of U.S. Airbus
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* The U.S. is very concerned about the European Airbus manufacturers, claiming heavy government subsidies are unfair to U.S.
manufacturers.
* The U.S. joined by many agriculture exporters, including the
Cairns group with developing countries, Australia, Canada, and others
want to negotiate reduction in government subsidies on agricultural
goods.
* The U.S. argues that many third world countries do not adequately protect intellectual property, and the U.S. raised tariffs on
many imports from Brazil because the U.S. felt Brazil was not adequately protecting intellectual property. The U.S. action was a clear
treaty violation.
* Japanese company groupings, the Keiretsu, are argued to be unfair as effectively limiting imports.
C.

Characteristics of the Problem

Now that I have presented to you the specifics of several cases, let
me try to make some general propositions which describe the problem
regarding international economic relations and institutions which I feel
exists and must be faced today.
There are three characteristics which I intend to illustrate: (1) the
rapidly evolving global economic interdependence; (2) the erosion of
natural sovereignty; and (3) the potential failure of international institutions and the consequence of a power vacuum at the international
level.
1. The rapidly evolving global economic interdependence
In the late 1970s while in Calcutta to deliver lectures, I asked a
Complaint, INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 9, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1484; U.S. Makes Effort to Raise Airbus
Subsidy Issue in Geneva, INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 2, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1438; General Developments:
European Community. EC Will Block U.S. to Reopen Airbus Subsidy Dispute, INT'L TRADE
REP., Sept. 18, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1360.
Regarding the dispute between the United States and Brazil concerning the lack of protection
offered by this country to U.S. intellectual property rights, see, e.g., General Developments: Unfair Trade Practices. Hills Lifts $40 Million in Sanctions After Brazil Pledges to Enact Patent
Law, INT'L TRADE REP., July 4, 1990, Vol. 7, at 996; Vice President Quayle Visits Brazil. Calls
for More Intellectual Property Protection, INT'L TRADE REP., Aug. 14, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1204;
General Developments: Latin America. Brazil's Patent Office Taking Measures to Protect Trade
Marks, INT'L TRADE REP., Sept. 18, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1375. More generally, see U.S. Business
Group Calls for Comprehensive Agreement on Intellectual Property in NAFTA, INT'L TRADE
REP , Nov. 20, 1991, Vol. 8, at 1697.
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number of businessmen at a reception, what was the most important
influence on their business. Their answer-the U.S. Federal Reserve
rediscount rate. Why? Because of the impact on sale of jute, then Calcutta's principal product. Jute was used in carpet backing, often in new
houses. The U.S. was the single largest market, so new housing starts
were most important. These were influenced by mortgage interest rates.
This is a story that can be related in numerous other contexts:
* During the oil price shock of the 1970s, the farmers of Arkansas
directly felt the consequences of actions taken in the middle east.
* Securities brokers on Wall Street and elsewhere are beginning to
talk about the "24-hour market," whereby stock could be traded at any
time of the day or night, since at almost every hour of most days of the
year there is a major stock exchange open some place in the world.
During the stock market free fall in 1987, we heard breakfast radio
newscasters give detailed reports of the Tokyo and London stock markets, which had been open for hours and already developing trends that
would influence New York.
* The percentage of the U.S. economy that relies on international
transactions has been rising steadily, and a rising percentage of profits
and activity of large U.S. corporations is derived from international
transactions.
* The fax machine, as well as computer E-mail and many other
technological innovations, has tied the globe more tightly together. We
now watch wars on color television in our living rooms.
- Cultural and political differences of societies thousands of miles
apart are now affecting the flow of trade and therefore the economic
well-being of increasing numbers of friends and neighbors. Japanese
rice farmers argue the cultural importance of rice growing in Japanese
society, as well as the fears of world and natural calamities that breed
fears of food shortages, and play a heavy role in the ruling party of
Japan so as to make these sentiments effective in stopping rice imports,
thus affecting farmers in Arkansas and other parts of the U.S. and the
world.
As the cases I described indicate, there is a growing problem of
different national approaches to economic regulation. Different product
standards-health, safety, environmental, consumer protection-cause
market inefficiencies that reduce economies of scale and also reduce
everyone's welfare. Different approaches to competition or antitrust
policies create concerns about the fairness of the international trading
system. Cultural, linguistic, and educational differences create further
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tensions.
2.

The erosion of national sovereignty

For a variety of reasons, prominently including the developing economic interdependence mentioned above, the centuries-old traditions of
national sovereignty are being changed dramatically. For many countries, "sovereignty" is a relatively useless concept, since their economic
well being is so dependent on forces and events occurring outside their
boundaries.' Canada and Mexico feel this acutely. A U.S. change in
interest rate, perhaps by official action of the U.S. Federal Reserve
System, conditions and constrains what government leaders in those
other countries can do to influence their own economies. For many
smaller developing countries, national economic policy is now effectively made at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Such policy sometimes creates riots in those smaller countries.
Japan's remarkably high savings rate, partly a cultural phenomena, partly a result of economic systemic differences, has a large impact on world economic trade and investment flows and therefore on
the United States, sometimes constraining in a major way what U.S.
Federal Reserve or U.S. Treasury officials can do to implement desired
economic changes in the U.S. economy.
Politicians who are known to vociferously oppose the "loss of sovereignty" involved in certain international institution decisions (such as
a GATT panel decision), or in assuming certain additional treaty obligations on specified economic subjects, should be made to consider just
how much sovereignty their national government enjoys anyway, given
the operation of many international economic activities not effectively
controlled by any one nation.
Many transnational corporations now operate on a world wide
"playing field" and exercise effective economic power greater than that
of many nations. A fear of this power had led some nations to take
action that has harmed their own economies.7 On the other hand, a
6. JACKSON. THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note I; John H. Jackson, Transnational
Enterprises and International Codes of Conduct: Introductory Remarks for Experts (delivered to
the International Bar Association Meeting in Berlin, Aug. 27, 1980); Law Quadrangle Notes, 25
U. MICH. L. SCH. (1981).
7. See, e.g., JOHN WHALLEY, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND (1989); John H. Jack-

son, Transnational Enterprises and International Codes of Conduct: Introductory Remarks for
Experts, (delivered to the International Bar Association meeting in Berlin, Aug. 27, 1980); Law
Quadrangle Notes, 25 U. OF MICH. L. SCH. (1981) (1081); ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING
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major problem exists when certain unscrupulous international businesses effectively avoid the regulations of any nation, undermining prudential and consumer protection rules such as those for banking and
insurance institutions. The recent BCCI revelations amply demonstrate
some of these points. The problem of tax evasion, 8 particularly in some
poorer developing countries also emphasizes this problem.
For national leaders, including many democratically elected and
conscientiously trying to carry out programs on behalf of their constituents, these world economic interdependent conditions are a source of
great frustration. What they legitimately want to do on behalf of the
electorate, and what they are able to accomplish are two widely separated facts, in a world where economic forces flow from nation to nation and around the world with speed beyond the comprehension of
most. These conditions are even more frustrating to political leaders,
and indeed sometimes electorally fatal, when the operations of our international economic system are difficult or impossible for the electorate to understand.
3.

The potentialfailure of internationalinstitutions and the consequence of a power vacuum at the internationallevel

These conditions, which I have just mentioned, call out for a better
international system of coordination. Yet the complex international institutional framework that we now have in place for economics is
mostly over forty years old and shows many signs of organization arteriolosclerosis in not being able to cope with or keep up with the fastpaced changes in international economic activity. This refers primarily
to the so-called "Bretton Woods System," which includes the GATT as
well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which I
will discuss below.
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, 128 (1987); Dean DeRosa, Protection in Sub-Saharan
Africa Hinders Exports, FIN. & DEV. (IMF), Sept. 1991, at 42; Arturo Israel, Changing Role of
the State in Development, FIN. & DEV. (IMF), June 1991, at 41; Poor Man's Burden, A Survey
of the Third World, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 23, 1989); See, e.g., IGNAZ SEIDL-HOVENVELDERN,
CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
See generally, the publications of the Centre on Transnational Corporations, United Nations,
New York, NY.
8. See Diana B. Henriques, In World Markets, Loose Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
1991, at DI; Richard Waters, The BCCI Shutdown; Leigh-Pemberton tells of 'CriminalCulture,'
FIN. TIMES, July 24, 1991, at 6.
COUNTRIES IN THE
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COPING MECHANISMS

How then can the national and international systems cope with the
problems we have discussed? First, let me briefly survey the mechanisms of the system which we now have in place.
A.

Post-World War II and the Bretton Woods System9

. During the last half of the 1940s, national leaders of the victorious
world war allies put in place a series of international institutions which,
regarding economics, had a two-fold purpose:
- To establish institutions that could help prevent war, insofar as
war is related to economic problems of the world. (It was thought that
the Great Depression and other similar economic problems between the
wars, had substantially contributed to World War II.)
* To put in place institutions that would help countries undertake
the necessary cooperation for policies, such as tariff reductions, which
would enhance world welfare, and thus help all countries.
The core policy assumption of most of this institutional effort was
that liberal trade and other freedoms for economic transactions would
best promote the welfare of all in the world, based on well-established
economic theories of comparative advantage, gains from trade, and
economies of scale. Thus, the basic approach was to provide international institutions that would constrain national governments from undertaking national oriented policies that, when copied by other nations,
would greatly damage these core economic principles and thus reduce
welfare for all, including the acting countries. It was a position based
largely on market oriented economic principles.
The first major conference for this institution was the Bretton
Woods Conference in 1944, which established the charters for the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. This conference did not
develop a program for trade, but it recognized the necessity for doing
SO.
Consequently, as soon as the United Nations was established, one
of its first tasks was to call for preparatory work which would lead to
charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO). Conferences
were held from 1946 until the Havana Conference in 1948, to prepare
this charter. At the same time, at the invitation of the U.S. pursuing a
9.
JOHN H. JACKSON. WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969) (Treatise on a Legal
Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, especially Ch. I & 2.).
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line of policy which it had begun with the 1934 Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act, countries joined together in negotiating reduction of
tariffs, and embodying them in the GATT.
It was not intended, however, that the GATT would be an organization, or the central governing treaty for international trade. The
GATT was designed to be subordinate to the ITO, and it was the ITO
that would be the organization and broader disciplining rule system.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Congress refused to approve the ITO. The
GATT came into provisional force, and is still applied through the protocol of provisional application, because United States legislation renewed in 1945 granted to the U.S. President the authority to enter into
a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement along the lines of the GATT.
This interplay between the constitutions of the United States and of the
international trading system was demonstrably extremely important in
shaping the post-World War II economic system.
The GATT has existed for more than forty years, and has essentially filled the vacuum left by the failure of an ITO to come into being. But the GATT has a number of "birth defects," based upon the
odd history of its origin. The GATT has a relatively inadequate and
short constitutional structure, and many important problems are left
unanswered. In addition, the GATT is difficult to amend, and has had
problems keeping its rules up to date in the face of rapidly changing
international economic circumstances. Nevertheless, the GATT has
been more successful than its founders had a right to expect, given the
problems of its origin. Among other things, despite very skimpy provisions in the GATT treaty itself, the GATT has developed a fairly elaborate procedure for dispute settlement, a point I will come back to
later.
The GATT has also sponsored a series of trade negotiation rounds,
the seventh being completed in the 1970s (Tokyo Round), and the
eighth being launched in the fall of 1986, and still in process (the Uruguay Round).
It is the situation of the Uruguay Round that raises a number of
matters which concern observers of the international economic scene.
On the one hand, the Uruguay Round was enormously ambitious, involving vast new subject areas such as trade in services, and intellectual
property, and making a major effort to finally bring trade in agricultural products under the general discipline of GATT. Although agricultural products are technically under the GATT rules, the practice of
nations throughout the history of GATT has resulted in de facto avoid-
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ance of those rules for many agricultural products, a problem which
the United States government tried valiantly to correct in both the
1960s Kennedy Round, and in the 1970s Tokyo Round, both
unsuccessfully.
The current round was supposed to culminate in a ministerial
meeting in December 1990, in Brussels.'0 However, once again agriculture became the rock on which other matters floundered, and since agriculture had been made such a centerpiece of the negotiation by the
U.S. Government, when the European Community refused to budge on
its agricultural negotiating position, the negotiations essentially came to
a halt. Although there has been much background and staff work, and
a considerable amount of further attention by negotiators on other issues, the situation as we now talk remains one of stalemate because of
agriculture. There are some optimistic signs out of Geneva that finally
some movement might be achieved in the .next few weeks, but time is
running out.
B.

Regionalism

An important principle of the GATT has been Most Favored Nation (MFN). The basic idea of this principle is that governments that
are part of the GATT system should treat each other equally, without
discrimination. However, the GATT has an important exception built
into it for customs unions and free trade areas, when those type of arrangements achieve liberalization on "substantially all" trade and trade
barriers. Over the decades of GATT history, many groupings of nations 1 have taken advantage of this exception in GATT, and because
the GATT discipline on these activities has been rather lax, many commentators have suggested that this is a major loophole for GATT.' 2
But in any event, there has developed a number of important regional,
or special trade relationships, either as a customs union or a free trade
area. The most prominent among these is the EC, and this customs
union must now be reckoned as a major, if not the major trading force
in the world.
There have been some attempts to develop similar structures in
10. GATT, Draft, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc., Nov. 26, 1990.
11. GATT, Analytical Index Notes on the Drafting, Interpretation and Application of the
Articles of the General Agreement, Article XXIV:5(c), at 12-16.
12. Kenneth W. Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT: The Legacy of a
Misconception, 30 U. Cm. L. REv., 615 (1963).
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Latin America, and in the Pacific Basin and Asia, but none with quite
the success of the EC.
The U.S. has worked in this direction, however, with its northern
neighbor, Canada. After smaller arrangements with Israel, and the
Caribbean basin, the U.S. agreed with Canada to establish a free trade
area. This had been requested by Canada which felt vulnerable to the
ambiguities and unpredictability of the U.S. "unfair trade laws," particularly the countervailing duty law regarding subsidies. The U.S.
countervailing duty case against Canadian lumber was a rude awakening, which shocked Canada and led it to initiate negotiations for the
free trade area, an idea which had a one hundred year history, but only
came to completion in 1988.13
Subsequent developments I think are well known. Mexico had
been a major holdout from the GATT system, negotiating for entry in
the Tokyo Round, but then deciding not to proceed. But in the 1980s
Mexico finally recognized that its economic welfare depended on it
playing a role among the major trading countries of the world, and
particularly it needed some kind of treaty mechanism to guide and stabilize its relationships with the big neighbor to the north. After a variety of bilateral attempts, Mexico finally joined the GATT, but then
shortly thereafter approached the United States with a proposal to negotiate a free trade area, somewhat along the model of the
U.S.-Canada agreement. Since Canada felt vitally concerned about
the possibility of such a negotiation, the result has been to open a three
country negotiation towards a NAFTA. That negotiation is proceeding
now, currently on a very fast track with a considerable amount of high
level nudging to keep it on track.14
The relationship of these various regional arrangements to the
broader multilateral system of the GATT is perplexing. In general, it
should be quite possible for both the regional arrangements and the
GATT to co-exist and complement each other. Nevertheless, it has to
be recognized that the regional arrangements have posed some threat
to the force and importance of GATT, and this has been worrisome.
13. PETER MORICI, MAKING FREE TRADE WORK: THE CANADA-US AGREEMENT (1990);
Jeffrey J. Schott and Murray G. Smith, Editors, THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: THE GLOBAL IMPACT (1988).
14. See BNA ITR, supra note 6 at numerous pages, and President George Bush, North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch, May 6, 1991, Vol. 2, No. 18;
U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, Update on NAFTA Ministerials (Opening Statement
from a news briefing, Washington, D.C., Dec. 13, 1991), U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch, (Dec. 23,
1991), Vol. 2, No. 51.
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Unilateral and Bi-Lateral Operations

To round out our view of the landscape of various mechanisms to
manage economic interdependence, we must touch upon some unilateral and bilateral initiatives, with particular reference to the United
States.
The United States developed a very powerful tool, established
through congressional legislation which can be traced back to 1962, but
was substantially enhanced in the Trade Act of 1974, and is now
known as Section 301."5 This remarkable and quite unique provision of
domestic law provided a channel by which U.S. companies could petition the U.S. Government to complain in an appropriate international
form about perceived foreign government violations of U.S. trading
rights, or other foreign government actions deemed unfair, or "unreasonable." In some seventy cases since the 1974 Act, the U.S. has applied pressures to a variety of foreign countries on a variety of trading
subjects including some issues of trade in services and intellectual property. Overall, this pressure has been reasonably successful, but it has
involved several United States actions which were taken unilaterally in
rather flagrant violation of U.S. multilateral treaty obligations such as
the GATT. This has caused considerable worry among U.S. trading
partners, and has been a source of discussion in the Uruguay Round
negotiation.
Another example of a different sort of initiative, was the opening
of detailed discussions between the United States and Japan entitled
the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII).16 The cultural, political,
and economic systemic differences between the United States and Japan, have been perplexing to both sides for many decades. In broad
geopolitical terms, these two countries should be firm friends, seeking
comparable and often identical world objectives. However, the trading
relationship and other economic relations have been extremely troubled, bringing charges of racism on both sides, and engendering a considerable amount of grass roots political antagonism, and much comment as well as concrete statutory actions by the Congress. It is, in
short, not a healthy situation. The SIT negotiations were designed to
15.
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105 (1989); Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1978);
JAGDISH BHAGWATI and HUGH T. PATRICK, AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE
POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 91-103 (1990).
16. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediment Initiative: An Example of Bilateral
Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436 (1991).
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provide a means by which these two countries could speak to each
other in rather remarkable depth about their respective cultural and
economic regulatory environments, which might be affecting and damaging their economic relationships. The degree to which these discussions involve subjects normally viewed as totally within the domestic
competence and jurisdiction of a national sovereign, is truly remarkable
and demonstrates again how deep questions of international economic
interdependence reach into national circumstances.
D.

Techniques for Managing Interdependence

In discussing the various "coping mechanisms," I have so far dealt
with a variety of institutions and initiatives undertaken by governments, many of which were put in place during the 1940s. Now I
would like to turn to some fairly broad-based principles that motivate
various techniques for managing international economic relations and
interdependence.
1. Rule based system 7
One of the persistent differences of policy approach among diplomats and officials struggling with international economic relations, is
the difference in view about whether an organization like GATT should
be based on "power oriented diplomacy" or "rule oriented diplomacy."
I have more extensively discussed this difference in other works, but
briefly explained, it refers on the one hand to those who view a GATT
or another international organization as primarily a place for diplomatic discussions with diplomats on each side playing their cards, or
"chips," based on how powerful their nations are. On the other hand, a
rule oriented diplomacy is based on a system of agreed rules, with some
kind of a rule application procedure such as a GATT dispute settlement process, to back it up in a relatively meaningfully rigorous and
adjudicatory process. It is the latter process, that I and others have
suggested is important for assisting the management of international
economic interdependence. This is partly because the market oriented
economic systems involve essentially decentralized decision-making of
millions of entrepreneurs, and these entrepreneurs generally need some
kind of a rule-based system to give them a certain amount of guidance
17.
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and stability. Without such guidance and stability, the "risk premium"
of investment and market decisions can rise so as to reduce economic
efficiency and world welfare. An investor who plans to invest in a new
shoe-making plant in a small African country, may realize that for the
plant to be economically successful and have the necessary economies
of scale, it must produce shoes not only for that small country, but for
export. Thus, the stability of its right to export, i.e., the stability of the
exporting legal environment, becomes an essential ingredient in the investment decision. In today's world, it is the GATT, and almost the
GATT alone which gives this additional level of stability as part of the
background landscape for millions of investment and marketing
decisions.
2.

Harmonization8

Harmonization is clearly an important technique, particularly in
such areas as product standards and certain types of government regulation that relate to products or services. Nevertheless, harmonization
can probably only be pushed to a limited degree, at least at the broader
world-wide level (as compared to regional, or federal-state systems).
No one expects the world to become totally uniform, or stamped out of
one mold, and indeed it is unlikely that such a world would be particularly desirable to inhabit. Instead, any system must recognize and accommodate a very large degree of diversity, based in some cases on
cultural differences and in other cases on differences in level of economic attainment, or government systems, etc., as well as different,
rich, historical backgrounds.
The European Community has been experimenting and proceeding
further along harmonization lines, but even it has ameliorated the notion of harmonization. Rather than assuming that there must always be
a complete similarity or identity of product standards, for example, the
community is experimenting with a notion of certain minimal levels of
product standards, accompanied by requirements upon member states
to "recognize" satisfactory product standards imposed by other states,
even though they differ in certain respects. Harmonization clearly will
be an important driving force, but it also clearly has certain important
limitations.
18.
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3. Reciprocity
Another technique for managing interdependence, is the "reciprocity" notion. Under this concept, there develops a system of "swaps," or
reciprocal "deals," by which different countries agree to different obligations, but try to match up their effect so that each country feels it is
receiving as much benefit as it is giving. To some degree the concept of
reciprocity, well known in GATT, is a fallacy. Unilateral trade liberalization measures, for example, can in certain circumstances enhance the
welfare of the acting nation. Nevertheless, reciprocity has been an important political driving force for trade liberalization throughout the
history of tariff reduction agreements, particularly since the 1934 U.S.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
It should be noted, that the most successful achievement of GATT
regards reduction of tariffs on industrial products imported into industrial countries. Yet, the approach of GATT on tariffs was not "harmonization." Rather, each country developed a list of tariff "bindings,"
often quite different from those of other countries. One country would
bind a tariff on bicycles, another on radios, another on tractors. Over
time, the system provided for extensive tariff liberalization, which in a
sense drives tariffs towards a "harmonized zero level," but the notion
was not based on a theory of harmonization.
Today of course, the real challenge facing international trade is
less focused on tariffs, and more focused on nontariff barriers. Nevertheless, there may be ways to utilize the reciprocity notion in connection with nontariff barriers, although often it becomes much more difficult because negotiators tend to want some kind of quantitative
standard by which to evaluate the fairness of trade-offs, and such quantification can be difficult, if not impossible in connection with rule-oriented code structures. For example, how can negotiators predict what
will be the trade advantage of a customs valuation code, even in the
first year, and much less for five or ten years in advance?
4.

The Interface Concept

Another technique for managing interdependence, I have termed
the "interface concept." The basic idea here, is that even economies
which are relatively similar have important differences-structural,
cultural, governmental. These differences can generate both economic
and political problems, i.e., a sense of "unfairness" among political constituencies. Thus, these differences, which may be as "simple" as differ-
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ent debt-equity ratios in the capitalization of firms, sometimes need to
be ameliorated by some kind of international buffering mechanism so
as to soften their impacts, or minimize the tension-creating political if
not economic effects. The GATT is an important "interface mechanism." However, one also can focus on activities within the GATT such
as "safeguards" (escape clauses unfortunately not too successful), as an
interface mechanism. I have even written elsewhere that the antidumping duties may be performing such a buffering "interface mechanism"
in certain kinds of contexts, although never originally intended to be
for that purpose.
The injury test in a variety of trade law procedures becomes an
"interface mechanism." The basic idea is that trade between even radically different economic structures (such as nonmarket economies compared to market economies) should be facilitated, but some kind of an
interface mechanism will be necessary to prevent the impression of one
side having taken advantage of the other.
The above broad categories of techniques for managing interdependence undoubtedly do not exhaust the possibilities. But they illustrate the importance of the system accommodating a variety of approaches, and not just one single approach. Needless to say, a variety
of approaches requires a more sophisticated international institutional
structure in order to appropriately supervise these techniques.
IV.

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AND REFORM: THE LAWYER'S
PROBLEMS

Now that we have looked at the nature of the problem, and a brief
overview of the existing mechanisms designed to cope with the problem, I wish to turn to some measures that can be taken to improve
these mechanisms.
I think you can see the direction of my thinking. Somehow, given
the fading of importance of national sovereignty, there must be a
mechanism by which governments can enter into meaningful cooperation. Essentially this means negotiated treaty norms that are reasonably
effective. This is not the same as a "super sovereign" or "international
government." It is instead a pragmatic but effective and reasonably efficient international cooperative mechanism that can give governments
an important tool for managing the problems of international economic
interdependence. Somehow the international system has to have the capability of studying a problem, getting diplomats together to try to formulate norms or rules which can help solve the problem, and then put-
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ting in place a mechanism that will make these rules reasonably
effective. Does this mean "yielding sovereignty?" Of course it
does-just as states have yielded sovereignty to the federal government
in order to achieve cooperative approaches that are impossible when
each state acts alone for only its own benefit.
A.

Dispute Settlement Procedures1 9

One part of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round have focused
on the GATT dispute settlement system, and its need for improvement.
As I mentioned earlier, the GATT dispute settlement procedure is
based on very skimpy treaty provisions, but forty years of trial and
error practice and evolution have resulted in a remarkably sophisticated system, which indeed has a rather good record. It has handled
more than twice the number of the cases during the same period of
time as the World Court, and some of these cases have been far more
significant than World Court cases. For the most part, the cases have
resulted in panel reports adopted by the GATT Council, which if not
immediately, nevertheless eventually, have been accepted and implemented by the losing party in the panel procedure. This is certainly
true of the United States which on a number of occasions has found
itself on the losing end of a GATT dispute panel, but has on the whole
graciously accepted that position and with effort, achieved a reform of
its law usually requiring congressional enactment, so as to bring its law
into consistency with its GATT system obligations.
But the procedure has some major defects. One of those defects
has been a principle of consensus governing the Council approval of a
panel report, which has in effect, allowed the losing party to block such
GATT approval. This blocking has occurred in relatively few cases, but
they have been troublesome. Thus, one of the tasks of the negotiators
has been to try to improve the GATT procedures so as to avoid this
blocking. A proposal that is sitting on the table would create in lieu of
Council approval, an appellate tribunal. This itself is quite innovative
in international law terms.
Another problem of the GATT dispute settlement procedure is
that a number of separate treaty agreements which are part of the
GATT system have separate dispute settlement processes, so that there
19.
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are in effect six or eight different procedures. This causes troublesome
disputes as to the appropriate form, or the methodology of dispute settlement. It is proposed in the negotiation to establish one unified dispute settlement system for all of the GATT system disputes, probably
including even the new areas under negotiation such as services and
intellectual property.
B.

Restructuring the GATT: A WTO or MTO?20

Because of a number of structural "birth defects" of the GATT
system, which I have more elaborately discussed in other works, but
eluded to previously in this article, there has recently been some attention during the Uruguay Round about the possibility of developing a
new legal structure for the GATT and the new issues of the Uruguary
Round. The need for this attention is derived both from the problems
now seen in wrapping up the Uruguay Round negotiation and providing for the appropriate treaty instruments to implement it, and from
the developments in the negotiation for improvement of the dispute settlement system.
As part of the process of concluding the Uruguay Round and effectuating it, attention is forced to the institutional mechanism which
will carry out the mandates and rules established by the negotiators.
These include the new subjects of trade in services and intellectual
property, which are not now under the GATT. It is generally felt inappropriate to try to simply include those subjects in the existing GATT,
since so many of the GATT rules have been developed in the context of
trade for goods, which do not adequately apply to these other subjects.
On the other hand, if separate and separable treaty instruments are
established for rule systems for services and/or intellectual property,
this raises the issue of what becomes of the GATT. One most prominent approach recognizes the need for some type of overall umbrella, or
supervising institution, which could service and facilitate the GATT, a
services agreement, an intellectual property agreement, and possibly
some agreements to be added in the future, as international economic
activities continue to change. In short, the negotiation "end game"
forces attention to the institutional problems of the GATT. In light of
the many birth defects and difficulties of the existing GATT, it seems
sensible to recognize a major opportunity at the end of the Uruguay
Round for such structural change.
20.
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The basic idea put forward is to establish a small charter which
would itself have no substantive obligations, but merely deal with the
procedural and legal framework of an umbrella organization, much as
an ill-fated attempt in 1955 entitled the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC) contemplated. This time it is proposed that such a simple institutional structure be embodied in an organization to be called a
World Trade Organization (WTO) or Multilateral Trade Organization
(MTO). Although time does not permit me to go into depth about
some of the legal questions of this structure (I have elsewhere written
more extensively about this also), the major government participants in
the Uruguay Round have extensively discussed these matters, and at
least several of the top four countries (U.S., EC, Japan and Canada)
have taken the position favoring the establishment of such a new organizational structure.
Likewise, the problem of how to facilitate a unified dispute settlement procedure which would embrace not only GATT and goods questions, but services and intellectual property, forces attention to the institutional structure. Such a unified dispute settlement system must
have a facilitating organization to back it up, including a secretariat,
and certain overall rules. Once again, it seems sensible to have a structure that becomes part of an overall umbrella organization to serve the
various trade rule systems, and potential new ones in the future.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

In my opinion, any appraisal of the world's economic system leads
to several linked conclusions:
1) Economics plays a role of enormous importance in world affairs,
and relates to questions of avoiding war, as well as reducing poverty
and developing satisfactory living standards for billions of people.
2) Economic interdependence is increasing very fast. It has important advantages-increasing competition and stimulating innovation to
provide better living standards for all; but it also poses considerable
problems.
3) Such interdependence has undermined our existing government
institutions both at the national and international level:
• national sovereigns have greater and greater difficulty responding to the challenges of interdependence and find they cannot often "go
it alone" anymore-international cooperation becomes essential; and
• the existing international government institutions for cooperation, including the Bretton Woods System and GATT, may be inade-
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quate to the tasks of managing international economic interdependence
as they are largely out of date and falling behind the pace of change.
4) The GATT and its complex trading system, faulted by birth
defects from its beginning, has worked better than any one had a right
to predict, but has had increasing difficulty coping with many problems
confronting it. The Uruguay Round impasse and difficulties partly reflect this.
5) Thus, important attention is needed upon these international
institutions, and this is a major challenge to the legal profession with
its general expertise on "constitutions." The "constitution" of GATT
needs restructuring.
6) The puzzle, of course, is the direction which this restructuring
should take. National leaders still fear "internationalism" or "loss of
sovereignty," and with some good reason because a number of our international organizations have left much to be desired. We must legitimately worry about too great concentrations of power at the international level, just as our forefathers worried about this for our own
constitution. Yet to avoid the issue invites disaster-a vacuum of power
at the international level will play into the hands of the unscrupulous,
and will cater to short term parochial interests like those that led to the
1930s disastrous tariff increases such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.
The dilemma of individual national actions causing damage to the
world economy can only be broken by cooperative efforts.
7) These cooperative efforts require two conditions: A rule-based
system which enhances the effectiveness of negotiated obligations as a
basis for market-based entrepreneurs to make decisions; and an institutional framework which, although carefully hedged against abuse of
power, can facilitate the rule-based system through dispute settlement
procedures, and new rule-making opportunities.
The GATT, after the Uruguay Round, has a formidable agenda of
tasks ahead of it. These include a long list of perplexing subjects, many
of them posing policy dilemmas. Only a partial list includes:
Competition or anti-monopoly policies
The problem of providing rules for state trading or
government-owned enterprises
The question of science and appropriate product standards
The importance of cultural differences on world trade in
products and services
Environment regulation, especially the environment of the
world sometimes called the global commons
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The link of human rights and work place standards of trade
policy
The relation of monetary institutions such as the IMF to
trade policy
And the need to rethink a number of traditional GATT trade
policy concepts such as:
Most favored nation treatment
National treatment and scientific justification for
national treatment of products and services
Reciprocity notions
Regionalism and how a GATT institution can mediate the
growing power of regional trade blocs
Safeguards and the escape clause, as well as adjustment
mechanisms for workers and enterprises
Unfair trade rules and the level playing field
Let's hope that the GATT system will be able to carry out these
weighty responsibilities. It is my conclusion that without some important institutional restructuring and enhancement, it is unlikely to be
able to do so.

